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Abstract
This paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the
first comprehensive and exhaustive study of adversarial
attacks on human pose estimation. Besides highlighting
the important differences between well-studied classifica-
tion and human pose-estimation systems w.r.t. adversar-
ial attacks, we also provide deep insights into the design
choices of pose-estimation systems to shape future work. We
compare the robustness of several pose-estimation architec-
tures trained on the standard datasets, MPII and COCO.
In doing so, we also explore the problem of attacking non-
classification based networks including regression based
networks, which has been virtually unexplored in the past.
We find that compared to classification and semantic seg-
mentation, human pose estimation architectures are rela-
tively robust to adversarial attacks with the single-step at-
tacks being surprisingly ineffective. Our study show that
the heatmap-based pose-estimation models fare better than
their direct regression-based counterparts and that the sys-
tems which explicitly model anthropomorphic semantics of
human body are significantly more robust. We find that the
targeted attacks are more difficult to obtain than untargeted
ones and some body-joints are easier to fool than the oth-
ers. We present visualizations of universal perturbations
to facilitate unprecedented insights into their workings on
pose-estimation. Additionally, we show them to generalize
well across different networks on both the datasets.
We append the supplementary material to the end of this
paper.
1. Introduction
The past few years have witnessed an exponential growth
in the real-world deployment of deep-learning based au-
tomation systems, due to its phenomenal ability to learn
complex task-dependent features and decision-functions di-
rectly from the data. However, alongside their innumerable
successes deep-learning systems are extremely prone to ad-
†equal contribution
versarial attacks which refer to imperceptible noise that can
significantly affect performance! Therefore, the study and
defense against adversarial attacks on deep-learning sys-
tems is critical towards their real-world deployment.
Discovering the extent of the harmful effects of adversar-
ial examples is still and active are of research. The study of
adversarial attacks on classification systems [3, 5, 7, 12, 13,
20,22,29,30] has seen more activity than regression systems
[8, 34]. Human-pose estimation, referred to as HPE for
brevity, is one such application that uses a blend of regres-
sion and classification approaches to learn the composition-
ality of human bodies, warranting a separate study. To this
end, we present the first comprehensive study of the effects
of adversarial attacks on HPE systems and their effective-
ness with respect to different design choices like heatmaps
vs. direct regression, multi-scale processing, attention and
compositional constraints.
Our analysis on two standard datasets, MPII [2] and
COCO [21], yields interesting insights that could prove use-
ful for shaping the future of robust deep-learning based HPE
systems. Our studies show that heatmap-based approaches
are more robust than direct joint-regression and among the
former, the networks that model compositional human con-
straints are more robust. We also find that imagenet pre-
training improves the robustness of network. We observe
that HPE networks are more difficult to attack than their
classification counterparts. Among targeted and un-targeted
attacks, the former are harder to obtain and also require
carefully tuned hyper-parameters. We also provide a thor-
ough study of adversarial attacks on the most popular HPE
backbone, Stacked Hourglass [26], and show that an attack
on features deep within the model is far more detrimental
than just on the final output. Then we show that universal
adversarial perturbations [16, 24] are detrimental to HPE
systems and supplement this finding with their visualiza-
tions which hallucinate body-joints. We show that the uni-
versal perturbations generalize fairly well across networks
that makes them a serious threat to HPE systems. Our anal-
ysis on the vulnerability of different joints towards adver-
sarial attacks reveal that the hip and the joints below the hip
are the most vulnerable while head and neck are most sta-
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(a) Target Pose (b) Attention-HG [9] (c) 8-Stack-HG [26] (d) DeepPose [39] (e) Chained-Preds [14] (f) DLCM [37] (g) 2-Stack-HG [26]
Figure 1. Example of various targeted adversarial attacks of different networks on the MPII benchmark. (a) represents the target pose used
for computing the adversarial perturbation while in figures (b-g) : Green skeletons show the original predictions while the red skeletons
show the predictions for perturbed image. For more visualizations refer supp. mat.
ble. Lastly we also test some image-processing techniques
on adversarial examples and show their effects
2. Related Work
Soon after AlexNet that made deep neural networks,
DNNs for brevity, popular, [36] showed that DNNs are
easily fooled by noise computed using L-BFGS technique.
Later, [15] introduced Fast-Gradient-Sign-Method (FGSM)
that was more efficient using only gradient ascent instead
of L-BFGS. Then, [25] introduced Iterative-Gradient-Sign-
Method (IGSM) and [19] made it stronger by optimizing
for the least likely class. Since then there has been a lot
of work in this field that extended these attacks with dif-
ferent datasets, penalty functions and optimization meth-
ods [5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 20, 22, 25, 27, 29, 35]. An altogether dif-
ferent line of work employed DNNs to directly generate ad-
versarial perturbations from an input image [4, 30, 33, 41].
These approaches require complete access to the network
limiting their practicality for real-world application. Black-
box attacks [22, 28, 29] generalize across networks and do
not need access to the target network that makes them more
practical.
Most of the aforementioned attacks are image-specific
and need costly back-propagation through the entire net-
work. To mitigate this issue, a universal adversarial per-
turbation [16, 24] can be obtained for a DNN that can be
added to any image to fool the network. [24] show the ef-
fectiveness of universal attacks on the ImageNet, while [16]
analyzed the same for semantic segmentation. Mostly, the
study of adversarial attacks has been limited to image clas-
sification, only recently, they have been analyzed in other
settings such as image segmentation (again a per-pixel clas-
sification) [3, 13, 16, 30, 40, 42], object detection [8, 34],
visual question answering [43].
For human pose, on the other hand, there hasn’t been
much study of adversarial attacks and the closest work to
ours is [10] that explores metric specific loss functions for
different tasks. Their focus was on exploiting loss func-
tion frameworks to develop metric specific attacks and they
demonstrate their approach on classification, segmentation
and HPE. Therefore, their study on HPE does not cover it
in detail rather showcases it as application of their generic
framework. We, on the other hand, present a comprehensive
analysis of adversarial attack on the HPE systems to obtain
deeper insights.
3. Background, Notations and Experimental
Settings
This section contains background on HPE and adversar-
ial attack to facilitate understanding and the details of ex-
perimental settings with notations.
3.1. Human Pose Estimation (HPE)
It refers to inferring a set of 2D joint-locations or pose,
P = {P1, P2, . . . Pk} for k body joints from an input RGB
image, I , that contains a human. The first DNN based
approach, DeepPose [39], used AlexNet [18] followed by
direct regression for ground-truth P˜ from I . Later, [38]
introduced heatmaps that represents k joint-locations with
the help of k channels, one for each joint, with Gaussian
bumps centered at the corresponding joint locations. The
input image, I , is passed through multiple resolution banks
and multi-scales features from different resolutions are con-
catenated to regress for the heatmaps. In [26], the authors
introduced a recurring structure that feeds the previously
predicted heatmaps for further processing with image fea-
tures, referred to as Stacked Hourglasses, it has been used
as the backbone architecture in numerous works and led to
significant improvement in the performance over previous
approaches. In order to provide a comprehensive coverage
of HPE systems for our study we analyze five different ar-
chitectures.
DeepPose and Stacked-Hourglass or SHG for brevity
[26], are already explained in the paragraph above. We used
two different variants with 2 and 8 stacks termed as 2-SHG
and 8-SHG. Chained-Prediction [14] casts HPE as a se-
quential joint prediction with a series of encoder-decoder
networks that predict heatmaps of joints, thus conditioning
the prediction of joints over the pre-computed joints. Hour-
glass Attention [9] incorporates multi-context attention by
utilizing CRFs to model the correlations between neigh-
bouring regions in the attention map. Deeply-Learned-
Compositional-Model or DLCM [37] uses hourglass
modules as backbone and exploits DNNs to learn the com-
positionality of the human body by enforcing a bone-based
part representation as the output of intermediate stacks.
With the use of only five hourglass modules, it outper-
forms other methods while being computationally cheaper.
A more detailed description of all the used architectures is
provided in the supp. mat. Sec. 1.
Whenever possible we use the released networks from
the authors, otherwise we implement ourselves. Further,
we use a standard protocol to evaluate the performance for
different networks on the validation sets that includes sim-
ilar cropping and data pre-processing. Therefore, our re-
ported results might be a little inferior to the reported re-
sults that employ flipping, multiple crops and other similar
techniques. In order to show the generalizability of our find-
ings, we study two different pose databases - MPII [2] and
COCO [21]. We use PCKh [2] and OKS [1] as metrics
for MPII and MS COCO, respectively. All the results are
reported on the validation set. Due to space constraint, we
show the results on MPII in this manuscript and refer to the
supp. mat. for the results on MS COCO.
3.1.1 Adversarial Attack Methods
Theoretically, adversarial attack consists of adding an ad-
versarial noise n, to the input I , of a network f(x; θ), that
changes the output y = f(I; θ).
Fast Gradient Sign Method [15] which explicitly bound
the maximum magnitude (l∞ norm) of every pixel are most
popular and relatively computationally cheap. FGSMs use
the scaled, by , sign of gradient w.r.t. the desired objective
to obtain n : ‖n‖∞ < . They can either be targeted or un-
targeted and single-step or iterative. An untargeted FGSM
attack (FGSM-U) simply increases the loss of the network
for a given input I to obtain perturbed input Ip as-
Ip = I + .sign(∇IL(f(I; θ), y)) (1)
Whereas, a targeted FGSM attack (FGSM-T), pushes the
output of the network towards a target yt. For classifica-
tion systems, yt can be easily obtained as the least likely or
target output of the network [20]. Unfortunately, HPE sys-
tems do not have a least likely target pose for a given input
image. Therefore, we choose at random one target pose, P t
from a pool of ground-truth poses from the validation set,
P = {Pˆ1, Pˆ2, . . . }, that gives a PCKh value of 0 for the
predicted P = f(I; θ) . This can be construed as selected
the most unlikely pose for a given image and leads to-
Ip = I − .sign(∇IL(f(I; θ), P t)) (2)
Both untargeted and targeted FGSM attacks, can be ex-
tended to their iterative counterparts IGSM-U-N and
IGSM-T-N, respectively, that iterate N times to yield the fi-
nal perturbed image Ip starting with I . The perturbed image
Ipi for the i
th iteration for untargeted (Eq. 3a) and targeted
(Eq. 3b) attack is given as-
Ipi = C(I, I
p
i−1 + α.sign(∇IL(f(Ipi−1; θ), y))) (3a)
Ipi = C(I, I
p
i−1 − α.sign(∇IL(f(Ipi−1; θ), P t))) (3b)
s.t. x0 −  ≤ C(x0, xi) ≤ x0 +  (3c)
where, C(x) clips x to [x− , x+ ].
All the aforementioned attacks are image-specific and re-
quire costly back-propagation through the network for its
computation. Therefore, [24] proposed to learn image-
agnostic or universal perturbations from a representative
subset of images for a given image distribution. In our ex-
periments, however, we adopt the method in [16] to HPE
systems and obtain the universal perturbation u. Its an iter-
ative process that computes perturbations on training sam-
ples xi, or mini-batches of them, and aggregates them to
obtain the final u after re-scaling-
u = u+ δ.sign(∇xiL(f(xi; θ), y) (4)
We fix δ = 200 , mini-batch size of 16 and ‖u‖∞ ∈ {8, 16},
because lower  values hindered learning while higher val-
ues are perceptible and use the same setting for all the archi-
tectures. The obtained u can be simply added to any image
to attack the network, therefore, making it more widely ap-
plicable than network access attacks.
Since the performance of the used models differ, it
is not fair to compare the degradation due to adver-
sarial attacks using the drop in absolute performance.
Therefore, for untargeted and universal attacks, we report
(perturbed/original) ∗ 100 score ratio for which lower
values indicate more effective attack. For the targeted at-
tacks, we report the target PCKh score of the output w.r.t.
to the target, therefore, higher values indicate more effec-
tive attacks. The degress of intensity which measured by
the maximum permissible pixel differences between Ip and
I and denoted by  is varied in {0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32}.
For iterative attacks, we have chosen to report the effects
under a setting similar to that popularly employed to at-
tack classification systems and limit the maximum number
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Figure 2. Comparison of different types of attacks on all the models. (a) and (b) depict the relative PCKh as a function of  for FGSM-U
and IGSM-U-10, respectively. (c) emphasizes the difference between direct regression and heatmap under IGSM-U-10 attack. (d) depict
the final PCKh with respect to the target for IGSM-T-20. (e) & (f) shows the relation between number of iterations and effectiveness of
untargeted and targeted attacks, respectively.
of iterations to 10, but the HPE systems are relatively ro-
bust, therefore, we also report the result with a maximum of
100 iterations. However, the targeted attacks are still diffi-
cult, therefore, they require 20 iterations. Overall, it yields
four different configurations of attacks IGSM-U/T-10/20,
and IGSM-U/T-100/100. Also, we observe that the optimal
value of the step-size, α, falls in the range [ 3 ,

2 ] for untar-
geted and in [ 9 ,

7 ] for targeted attacks. We report the results
of IGSM-U/T-100 with  = 8 and refer to supp. mat. Sec.
2 for other values of , while IGSM-U/T-10/20 results are
reported for all  values. Since this is a preliminary work on
attacks on HPE, we stick to the standard attack mechanisms
to provide insights into the problem.
4. Adversarial attack on HPE systems
This section starts with White Box Attacks, where we
have complete access to the target network, and study its ef-
fect under varying , number of iterations, architectures and
targeted vs. untargeted setting. Then we report results on
image-agnostic universal perturbations with varying  and
different architectures with their visualizations to shed light
on their workings. We also report the effect of both attacks
in black-box mode, in which we learn the perturbation using
one network and use it to attack a target network to which
we have no access. We also report the vulnerability of dif-
ferent body joints towards adversarial attack followed by
a discussion of interesting insights pertaining the different
architecture’s robustness and effect of some simple image
processing based defense strategies. We also performed a
similar study of COCO [21] dataset and can be found in
supp. mat. Sec. 3.
4.1. White Box Attacks
The complete access to a network exposes it to a vari-
ety of different attacks. The main result for this section is
shown in Fig. 2 that plots the effect of FGSM-U, IGSM-U-
10 and IGSM-T-20 attacks vs.  on different HPE architec-
tures described in Sec. 3.1.
4.1.1 HPE vs. Classification Systems
We first compare the robustness of HPE systems in general
to another task that involves per-pixel reasoning, semantic
segmentation (presented in [3]). A simple comparison be-
tween the relative drop in the performance for FGSM-U at-
tack on HPE Fig. 2a and semantic segmentation (ref. [3]
Fig. 2(a)) reveals that the HPE systems undergo less degra-
dation. While some part of the observed relative robustness
can be attributed to a more lenient metric, PCKh vs. IoU.
We believe that some of it perhaps comes from the succes-
sive down-sampling and up-sampling of the HourGlass in-
troduces multi-scale processing, which has been previously
reported to be effective against adversarial attacks on se-
mantic segmentation
4.1.2 Robustness of Different Models
The observations from Fig. 2 reveal that the order of robust-
ness of different models across different attacks is more or
less consistent. We can observe that the heatmap based ap-
proaches are more robust than direct regression (DeepPose)
based approach. This is because the direct-regression loss
function is also a measure of PCKh after thresholding while
heatmap loss produces Gaussian bumps at joint-location,
which is not as strongly correlated to PCKh. Also, heatmap
predictions, unlike regressed values, are implicitly bounded
to be valid image coordinates.
In order to make a fair comparison between, we use the
same ResNet backbone and use a simple regression loss
in one case, and de-conv layers followed by heatmap re-
gression in the other case. We name them as ResDec-
Pre and ResDec-NoPre for resnet-deconvolution with and
without imagenet pretraining. As seen in Fig 2c, relative
performance for untargeted attacks is noticeably higher for
heatmap loss. Also for ResDec-Pre, the relative perfor-
mance is even higher, validating the findings of [17]. Strik-
ingly, ResDec-Pre is almost as robust as the most robust
network - DLCM. This advocates a requirement to move
away from the popular regression-based 3D-HPE frame-
works [11, 23, 32, 44] (see supp. mat. Sec. 6 for details
on 3D-HPE experiments). We leave theoretical understand-
ing of robustness caused by imagenet pretraining a question
for future study.
Due to the conditional joint prediction nature of the ar-
chitecture that propagates the perturbation in one joint to
the rest of the joints, Chained-Prediction turns out to be the
least robust among the heatmap-based approaches. We ob-
serve that DLCM is more robust than 2/8-SHG and Attn-
HG against all attacks, perhaps due to DLCM’s imposition
of human skeleton topology. This encourages further ex-
ploration of structure-aware models to counter adversarial
examples.
4.1.3 Effect of the Number of Iterations on the Attack
Fig. 2e 2f plots the relative drop and target PCKh for
untargeted and targeted attacks, respectively, for  = 8
with 10 and 100 iterations. We observe that moving from
10 to 100 iterations results in dramatic degradation for all
the networks under both the settings. This observation is
in contrast with the effect of IGSMs on classification or
semantic segmentation problems, where [19] finds that
min(d1.25e,  + 4) iterations are sufficient for complete
degradation. HPE, on the other hand, often needs up to 100
iterations for the same. Unfortunately, with enough itera-
tions, all the systems degrade by over 95% which shows
that all models are vulnerable for carefully designed pertur-
bations. See supp. mat. Sec. 2 for results on all  values.
4.1.4 Stacked Hourglass Study
Since most HPE systems build on the Stacked-Hourglass
backbone [26], we carry out a thorough analysis of ad-
versarial attack on SHG architecture with different network
hyper-parameters such as depth (number of stacks). First,
we find that increasing the number of hourglasses from 2 to
8 increases the robustness of the model; a fact clearly visible
from Fig. 2a 2b 2d. Next, we study the effect of simulta-
neous perturbation of outputs of all the stacks of SHG, in-
dicated by suffix ALL, and observe that the attacks become
more effective, again evident from Fig. 2a 2b 2d. Specif-
ically, 2-SHG-ALL and 8-SHG-ALL attacks increased the
target PCKh from 66.3 to 80.5 and from 60.5 to 73.0, re-
spectively. This is expected because downstream stacks are
supposed to improve upon the predictions of the upstream
ones and hence, incorrect prediction upstream will cascade
into errors in the final output. Further, intermediate super-
vision would provide better gradient flow especially since
the stacks are not connected via residual connections. In-
terestingly, 2-SHG-ALL IGSM-T-20 attack brings down its
performance even below Chained-Prediction and DeepPose
in, the two worst performing architectures in terms of ro-
bustness to adversarial attacks!
4.1.5 Targeted vs. Untargeted Attacks
Targeted attacks are more difficult than untargeted ones as
evidenced from the fact that targeted attacks require higher
number of iterations as compared to an untargeted attack,
20 vs. 10. It is because an untargeted attack can sim-
ply take large steps in the direction of increasing loss for
I , whereas, the targeted attack requires finding the optimal
Ip : ‖I − Ip‖∞ <=  where the loss L(f(Ip; θ), P t) is
small; a more difficult problem. We observe that the opti-
mal value of step-size α for IGSM-T is found to be almost
3 times smaller than that of IGSM-U as expected. However,
small step-size based iterative targeted attacks with suffi-
cient iterations, around 100, can still lead to almost 100%
target PCKh Fig 2e, 2f. As  increases, different archi-
tectures under untargeted attack converge in performance
while they diverge for targeted attacks! It indicates that un-
der extreme targeted attack different networks perform sig-
nificantly different in terms of their robustness. It is worth
noting that the Relative PCKh (relative degradation w.r.t.
(a) 2-Stacked Hourglass (b) Chained Predictions (c) Attention Hourglass
(d) 8-Stacked Hourglass (e) DLCM (f) DeepPose
Figure 3. Visualization of image-agnostic universal perturbations, with  = 8, for different networks scaled between 0 to 255 for better
visualization. Note the hallucinated body-joints, mostly arms and limbs to fool HPE networks. More vis. in supp. mat. Fig 4-6
original target) was almost equal in both IGSM-U-10 &
IGSM-T-20 (refer to supp. mat. Tables 3,7).
4.2. Image-Agnostic Adversarial Perturbations
We follow Sec. 3.1.1 to obtain the universal adversar-
ial perturbations for all the considered architectures. Once
obtained, they can be simply added to any input image to
fool the corresponding architecture, making them practi-
cally useful in real-world scenario. Fig. 6 shows the univer-
sal perturbations, scaled between 0 to 255 for better visual-
ization (more visualizations can be found in supp. mat. Fig
4-6). It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first visualiza-
tion of such perturbations for HPE, which reveal semantic
hallucinations. A closer look reveals that universal pertur-
bations confuse HPE systems by hallucinating body-joints,
mostly limbs, throughout the image. Visual inspection of
the skeletons predicted on these perturbations reveal sim-
ilarity with hallucinated joints and can be found in Supp.
mat. Fig. 8-13. Even more surprisingly, some networks
have similar prediction across different images despite the
fact that these perturbations were not explicitly designed to
predict these specific outputs. It is worth noting that while
all visualizations of UAP resemble the human body, visual-
ization of DeepPose UAP does not do so and since the UAP
are computed as the gradient averaged over all training im-
ages, this means that the heatmap based approaches have
minimized loss when the joints are discernible, but Deep-
Pose has not.
Universal perturbations degrade the original perfor-
mance, averaged over all models, on the training (used to
obtain them in the first place) and validation sets to 6.4%
and 9.9% of their original value, respectively with  = 16.
It clearly showing their strong effect, see supp. mat. for
results with  = 8. Network-wise results on the effect of
universal perturbations are reported in Table 1. Surpris-
ingly, their effect on the performance is similar in magni-
tude to image-specific iterative attacks, 9.9% vs. about 8%
for latter ( = 16). So these are computationally efficient
while being equivalent to Image-Dependent methods. We
also study the dependency of universal perturbations on the
amount of training data needed, as in [24], by obtaining
them with varying number of samples from the training set.
Please refer to supp. mat. Sec. 2.4 that shows the variation
of degradation ratio vs. number of samples. We observe
that even with 10% data samples, i.e. only 2500 images, the
obtained universal perturbations degrade the performance
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k 8-SHG 8.85 5.92 53.32 56.61 53.45 68.17 63.23 86.7 63.58
Attn-HG 41.92 48.47 11.47 57.62 61.05 71.68 68.1 84.78 61.95
DLCM 46.76 47.09 60.07 12.75 64.45 74.02 67.41 84.93 63.53
2-SHG 51.95 55.17 75.28 70.08 10.35 15.7 51.6 88.59 65.45
Chained 77.65 79.7 82.57 81.15 72.08 78.45 10.96 75.36 78.14
DeepPose 74.19 70.44 75.12 75.03 72.23 75.6 42.04 2.78 69.24
Table 1. The results of all source & target pairs under doubly black-box attack setting. Rows represent the relative degradation in the target
network when attacked by the network in the column. Vulner. stands for ease of attack under doubly black-box setting. Boldface shows
the strongest black box attack for a model and underlined numbers indicate the performance of the model on itself
Model and Attack Ankle Knee Hip Neck Head Shoulder Elbow Wrist
Relative PCKh
DeepPose-UI 0.63 1.24 4.43 17.52 13.11 4.39 2.35 2.2
2-SHGlass-UI 3.82 4.62 2.82 41.89 23.39 24.79 14.48 13.4
8-SHGlass-UI 8.79 10.9 3.04 45.54 34.61 29.67 20.65 20.54
Chained-Predictions-UI 2.79 2.07 3.53 22.7 15.73 11.87 4.05 3.77
Attention-HG-UI 6.52 7.61 3.05 39.31 25.01 21.35 17.54 16.96
DLCM-UI 6.28 6.79 2.12 45.69 29.72 28.04 17.75 16.4
Average 4.81 5.54 3.12 35.44 23.60 20.02 12.80 12.22
Target PCKh
DeepPose-TI 59.22 73.04 84.79 81.64 73.0 82.4 77.93 69.33
2-SHGlass-TI 62.61 69.65 86.0 70.05 49.79 72.73 64.68 47.59
8-SHGlass-TI 48.24 54.02 83.86 71.94 51.38 70.53 56.33 43.55
Chained-Predictions-TI 70.9 77.53 84.59 74.64 59.29 75.26 72.28 60.2
Attention-HG-TI 47.25 52.06 77.97 60.46 39.53 57.22 52.59 48.62
DLCM-TI 47.8 54.99 74.63 57.93 38.88 55.26 48.58 39.57
Average 56.00 63.55 81.97 69.44 51.97 68.9 62.07 51.47
Table 2. Relative PCKh of different body-joints for untargeted attacks across different networks. Boldface and underlined numbers indicate
the most and the least vulnerable joints, respectively. Note that hips, knee and ankles are more vulnerable than the rest.
to 18% vs. 9.9% with all the 25925 samples.
4.3. Black-Box Attacks
This setting refers to an attack on target network using
adversarial perturbations learned from a different network,
referred to as source network. We do not have access to the
target network at any stage except while evaluating the per-
formance. The perturbations can either be image-specific,
obtained by FGSM-U/T or IGSM-U/T from the input im-
age, or image-agnostic universal perturbations. The latter
gives rise to doubly black-box attacks i.e. we need neither
access to the target network nor do we use the image to
obtain the perturbation. We report all the combinations of
(S −→ T ) pairs and tabulate the results in Table 4.1.5 in
supp. mat., due to space constraints. In general, we observe
30-40% degradation in the target network’s performance.
Doubly black-box attacks are reported in Table 1 where
we can again observe fair generalization with 30-40%
cross-network degradation, on an average. We observe
that the generalization is stronger across similar architec-
tures. Specifically, Stacked-Hourglass’s perturbation de-
grades DLCM and Attention-Hourglass to 50%, but Deep-
Pose and Chained-Prediction to only 75%.
4.4. Body-Joint Vulnerability Towards Attack
In order to understand the effect of adversarial attack on
different body joints, we report per-joint accuracy under dif-
ferent architectures and attack-types for MPII dataset in Ta-
ble 2. For left-right symmetric body-joints (ankle, knee,
hip, shoulder, elbow and wrist), we report the left-right av-
erage degradation. Its evident that head and neck are the
most robust while hips are the most vulnerable across dif-
ferent attacks. It could be due to the fact that the HPE net-
works are trained on cropped images that have tightly local-
ized head in most of the samples, whereas limbs are spread
throughout the images at weird locations. Therefore, it is
difficult to fool the network in predicting head and neck in
some other region. Moreover, we observe that the relative
performance of different joints vary dramatically for untar-
geted attacks while it it doesn’t vary so much for targeted
attacks. These observations can motivate future work fo-
cus on understanding and improving robustness of the more
vulnerable joints.
5. Simple Image Processing for Defense
In this section we discuss the effect of simple image-
processing based defense strategies against adversarial at-
tacks on HPE systems. Since this is a preliminary work on
adversarial attacks on human pose, we focus only on com-
putationally cheap methods to mitigate the effect of the dif-
ferent attacks.
Recently [40], showed that the adversarial attacks in se-
mantic segmentation can be detected by analyzing the the
consistency of the predicted segmentation map. Similar rea-
soning can be extended to HPE systems and we thought
that the predicted skeletons from adversarially perturbed
image would look unrealistic. Surprisingly, visual inspec-
tion of the skeletons reveals that the skeletons are seman-
tically meaningful. It could be due to the implicit learning
of human-body structure that prevents the networks from
producing structurally garbage results even after adversar-
ial attacks. Secondly, we thought of checking the quality of
Gaussian bumps under adversarial attack thinking that they
might distort from being Gaussian. Again, we observe that
the bumps still resemble Gaussian which can be quantita-
tively measured using the KL divergence and is reported in
the sup. mat. Sec. 2. Therefore, even this measure cannot
be used for detecting the presence of adversarial attack.
We also tried simple geometric and image-processing
based defense strategies like flipping and smoothing. As
expected, smoothing worked well for both image-specific
and image-agnostic attacks, a finding supported by multi-
ple research work in the past [3, 31]. Also, we observe that
flipping an image-specific perturbations renders it relatively
ineffective. Specifically, a non-flipped version of image-
specific perturbation degrades the network to a range of 5-
10% whereas, its flipped version can only reduce it to about
70-75%. This shows that image-specific perturbations are
truly specific and don’t work with flipping. On the other
hand, universal perturbations were equally detrimental un-
der flipping too! It can easily be explained on the basis
of the fact that universal perturbations are generic while
image-dependent perturbation are very specifically aligned.
The same is also evident from the visualization of universal
perturbations.
6. Conclusion
We performed a dense and exhaustive analysis of vari-
ous adversarial attacks on human pose estimation systems,
using MPII [2] & COCO [21] and found some interest-
ing trends in how design choices affect robustness. We re-
port that the image-agnostic universal perturbations are as
detrimental an attack as image-specific iterative approaches
while being computationally much cheaper to obtain. Our
visualizations of universal perturbations exhibit a strikingly
human-like hallucinated array of body-joints to fool the net-
works. Further our analyses on the vulnerability of differ-
ent joints helped identifying the most and least robust body
parts under adversarial attack.
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Supplementary Material
1. Experimental Details
1.1. Datasets
Here we will explain the two datasets MPII [2] and
COCO [21] used in this work.
MPII Dataset. It is the defacto-standard dataset for
single person 2D pose estimation. The images were
collected from YouTube videos, covering daily human
activities with complex poses and image appearances.
There are about 25k images for training set and 3k image
for validation followed be 7k images for testing. Since we
do not have annotations for the test dataset we used our
validation dataset to evaluate the effectiveness of all our
attacks. The metric used for this dataset is the PCKh metric.
COCO Dataset. The COCO Keypoint Challenge re-
quires in the wild multi-person detection and pose
estimation in challenging, uncontrolled conditions. The
COCO train, validation, and test sets, containing more
than 200k images and 250k person instances labeled with
keypoints. 150k instances of them are publicly available
for training and validation. The COCO evaluation defines
the object keypoint similarity (OKS) and uses the mean
average precision (AP) over 10 OKS thresholds as primary
metric. The OKS plays the same role as the IoU in object
detection. It is calculated from the distance between
predicted points and ground truth points normalized by
the scale of the person. Since OKS is a multiperson and a
detection metric we have used PCK as our main metric for
evaluation of COCO and performing adversarial attacks on
COCO.
1.2. Human Pose Architectures
In this section we discuss the different architectures used in
our work along with relevant implementation details.
DeepPose. Introduced in [39], it was the first DNN based
approach used for Human Pose Estimation. They used a
simple alexnet backend along with fully connected layer
which directly regresses the pixel coordinates in image
space and thus was a fully supervised method. For our pur-
poses since there was no official code or pretrained models
we implemented the network with an Image-net pretrained
resnet34 back-end and trained for both MPII and COCO
datasets.
Chained Predictions Network. Introduced in [14],
Chained Predictions network adapts a sequence to sequence
model for structured prediction of human body joints i.e.
the joints are predicted in a sequential manner. The pre-
diction of a joint, thus, not only depends on input but also
on the set of previously predicted joints. It uses an ima-
genet pretrained backend followed by series of convolution-
deconvolution layers which predict heatmap of 1 joint at a
time. Since there was no official codebase or pretrained
model, we implemented the network with a resnet34 back-
end along with deception layers (multiscale deconvolution)
as described in the paper. It must be noted that the authors
used a cross entropy loss function to learn the heatmaps but
we instead used simple MSE loss as we were not able to
attain convergence when using the cross-entropy loss. We
train the model for both - MPII and COCO datasets. While
our network does not directly reflect original performance
but it shows the effect of cascaded predictions on robust-
ness.
Stacked HourGlass Network. Introduced in [26], SHG is
one of the most popular networks used for 2D human pose
estimation. It uses the hourglass structure, which consists
of sequence of convolutions followed by nearest neighbour
upsampling layers and skip connections in parallel which
resembles the structure of hourglass. It is believed that this
repeated upsampling and downsampling allows the network
to learn overall context of image at all scales. The original
authors used 8 Stacked HourGlass Network. We implement
two variants of this network - one with only 2 stacks but 2
residual modules per layer instead of 1 (as described in the
paper), and one with 8 stacks for which we used the offi-
cial code base and MPII pretrained models provided by the
authors. For the 2 Stacked Hourglass we trained the mod-
els ourselves on both MPII & COCO dataset. It should be
noted that while performing adversarial attacks on human
pose estimation we only perform adversarial attacks on last
stack for maintaining uniformity among models. Nonethe-
less we have also shown the results on adding perturbations
to all stacks of the original 8 stacked model named by SHG-
ALL and presented in Sec. 4.1.4 of the paper.
Pose Attention. Introduced in [9], Attn-HG adopts the
stacked hourglass network as it’s baseline and used CRFs
for building correlations within the heatmaps. It also in-
troduces novel HRU’s (Hourglass Residual Module) as re-
placement for residual units which incorporate larger ker-
nels to use larger receptive fields. We use the pretrained
model provided by the authors for evaluation on MPII
dataset.
DLCM. Deeply Learned Convolutional Model (DLCM for
brevity) was introduced in [37] and is at the time of writ-
ing this paper, at the top of MPII leaderboard. It is based
upon the Stacked HourGlass architecture and it explicitly
learns the compositionality of human bodies. Apart from
characterizing only the human joints it also learns the high-
order relationships among body parts. Moreover they just
use 5 stacks on contrary to other approaches and thus being
computationaly lighter. The first and ultimate stack regress
heatmaps corresponding to joints, second and penultimate
stack regresses heatmaps corresponding to bones and the
third stack corresponding to even higher order relations. We
used the pretrained models provided by the authors for our
work.
2. More Results on MPII Dataset
In this section we provide quantitative and visual re-
sults to establish that the heatmaps predicted in the case
of untargeted attacks are almost as good as those predicted
by targeted attacks, demonstrating how well networks have
learned to predict gaussian bumps. We go on to provide
more details about the effect of limiting the data available
for generating the adversarial perturbations on the effective-
ness of the perturbations.
2.1. Quality of Heatmaps
In this section we report the values obtained for the KL
divergence between a gaussian bump centered at the loca-
tion predicted by the network and the heatmap generated
by the network in case of the the original images, as well
as adversarial images generated via targeted and untargeted
iterative attacks. In all cases we assume that the heatmaps
produced by the network represent the un-normalized log
probabilities and compute the KL divergence of the model’s
outputs with respect to the ideal gaussian bump. We find
that the KL divergence (averaged across all the images in
the validation set for the 8-Stacked-Hourglass) is 0.000902
for the untargeted attacks, 0.001024 for targeted attacks and
0.000640 for the original predictions. Clearly there is not
much of an increase as compared to the original predictions
which demonstrates how well the model has learned to pre-
dict gaussian bumps at all costs. The fact that the targeted
attack yields a higher KL divergence than the untargeted is
because in many cases the output of the targeted attack con-
tains 2 gaussian bumps - one centered at the correct joint
location and one centered at the target joint location.
In Fig 1 we provide sample heatmaps generated by the
model on targeted and untargeted adversarial samples as
well as the ideal heatmaps used to train with in each case.
2.2. Detailed Results
In this section we provide numbers for all the models
on all the attacks that we perform. The numbers in Tables
3 and 5 represent the relative PCKh on the validation set
while those in Tables 4 and 6 represent the target PCKh
with respect to the new target. Table 2 lists the PCKh of
the different model on the validation set under our experi-
mental set up. Since we do not use multiple crops, flipping
and other methods to provide further boosts in performance,
the numbers we report may be slightly inferior to the ones
originally reported in the relevant papers.
(a) Ideal Heatmap centred at ac-
tual joint location
(b) Model’s output for Untargeted
Iterative Attack
(c) Ideal Heatmap centred at target
joint location
(d) Model’s output for Targeted It-
erative Attack
Figure 1. Visualization of the various heatmaps produced by the
8-Stack-Hourglass for a particular joint.
2.3. Results with 100 iterations
We also performed all the experiments for 100 iterations
and we hereby show the plots for the same with minimal
discussion. Fig. 2 & Fig. 3 show the plot comparison of
different models
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Figure 2. Plot showing the Relative PCKh of different models wrt
different epsilons under IGSM-U-100
2.4. Effect of Amount of Data on Universal Pertur-
bations
We demonstrate that limiting the amount of data used to
generate the universal perturbation does not lead to much
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Figure 3. Plot showing the Absolute PCKh (corresponding to new
target) of different models wrt different epsilons under IGSM-T-
100
degradation in the effectiveness of those attacks. We do
this by limiting the number of images of the training set
we use to generate the perturbation and then use the (previ-
ously unseen) validation set to quantify the effectiveness of
the attack. We perform this experiment on the 8-Stacked-
Hourglass which forms the backbone for a lot of the other
models.
We also provide a visualization of the perturbations gen-
erated in each case in Fig 6. It is interesting to notice that
as the number of samples used increases, the perturbations
start to resemble humans more and more. In particular, the
effectiveness increases markedly when we move from 512
to 1250 training samples, and when we compare perturba-
tions generated using less than 512 images and more than
1250 images, we can see that the human shape (with a head
and hands) starts to become discernible for the first time at
1250 images.
We also provide a table for the doubly general universal
perturbations for  = 8.
3. Results on COCO Dataset
Here we will discuss the results on the COCO Keypoints
benchmark. COCO is mainly a multiperson keypoint detec-
tion benchmark. To perform our evaluation we have cho-
sen PCK as the main metric for our evaluation. Note that
we do not compute adversarial perturbations for any of the
large 5/8 stacks models on COCO and hence only Chained,
DeepPose and 2-SHG have been used. The original perfor-
mance is present in Table 15.
3.1. Extensive Results
We performed all four combinations of Targeted, Un-
targeted and Fast, Iterative attacks on the validation set of
COCO benchmarks. Tables 10 11 12 13 show the results on
all combinations of these attacks.
3.2. Evaluation of vulnerability of Joints
We also performed a study of vulnerability of different
joints present in the COCO Keypoint benchmark. Table 14
shows the results of vulnerability of different joints under
IGSM-U-10 attacks. We again find the the joints present in
the leg are most vulnerable
4. Results on application of Simple Defense tac-
tics
Here we present result on application of simple defense
strategies such as flipping and gaussian blurring. Table 16
17 show the results of flipping and gaussian blurring on
Image dependent & Image Agnostic Perturbations respec-
tively.
5. Human Skeleton Visualizations
Figures 7-13 show the results of various adversarial at-
tacks on different images of MPII benchmark. Fig 7 show
the predictions of untargeted attacks which Fig 8 9 10 11 12
13 show predictions of different models subject to universal
perturbations. We find that the predictions corresponding
to universal perturbations on a single model look alike. On
closer investigation we also found that these predictions are
inspired by the humanish figure present in the respective
universal noise.
6. Evaluation of 3D Human Pose Estimation
As discussed earlier we find that direct regression based
approaches are much more vulnerable than corresponding
heatmap based approaches. In 3D-HPE, it is a general
scheme to regress the depth of a joint directly using a fully
connected layer [44]. We also compute adversarial pertur-
bations for 3D Human Pose Estimation networks. Specifi-
cally we used pretrained model provided by [44] on Human
3.6 dataset. We only computed adversarial perturbation for
perturbing the z coordinate. We found that indeed the model
was very vulnerable. MPJPE is the standard metric used
in 3D-HPE which measures the mean per joint prediction
error. The original model had performance of 60 MPJPE,
after applying adversarial perturbations the new MPJPE be-
came 360.
(a) 2-Stacked Hourglass (b) Chained Predictions (c) Attention Hourglass
(d) 8-Stacked Hourglass (e) DLCM (f) DeepPose
Figure 4. Visualization of image-agnostic universal perturbations, with  = 8, for different networks scaled between 0 to 255 for better
visualization generated. Note the hallucinated body-joints, mostly arms and limbs to fool HPE networks.
(a) 2-Stacked Hourglass (b) Chained Predictions (c) Attention Hourglass
(d) 8-Stacked Hourglass (e) DLCM (f) DeepPose
Figure 5. Visualization of image-agnostic universal perturbations, with  = 16, for different networks scaled between 0 to 255 for better
visualization generated. The hallucination for human body parts in clear in these visualizations as well.
(a) 128 training images (b) 512 training images (c) 1250 training images
(d) 2500 training images (e) 5000 training images (f) 17500 training images
Figure 6. Visualization of the image-agnostic universal perturbations generated from the 8-Stacked-Hourglass model using a limited number
of training samples. Note that as amount of data increased the perturbation look semantically more meaningful
newell attention DLCM 2HG chain-pred DeepPose newell-all 2HG-all Random Noise
newell 20.4 86.57 85.28 70.15 79.9 87.42 20.4 67.3 97.27
attention 79.78 16.09 85.27 75.96 79.06 87.02 73.98 68.32 96.3
DLCM 83.73 89.07 17.73 79.58 83.92 90.17 78.76 75.21 96.26
2HG 77.87 85.32 83.8 15.13 87.41 95.42 72.25 10.71 0.0
chain-pred 86.19 87.73 88.24 88.33 7.6 84.59 83.47 86.76 0.0
DeepPose 78.04 78.65 80.0 86.95 57.6 5.67 76.6 85.43 0.0
Table 1. Table containing performance of models on image-dependent black box attacks on MPII dataset. A row corresponds to the
performance of a single model being attacked by different models in different columns
Model PCKh on Validation Set
8-Stacked-Hourglass 88.51
Attenion 87.94
DLCM 89.46
2-Stacked-Hourglas 87.62
Chained Predictions 81.76
DeepPose 56.97
Table 2. Table showing the original performance of the models on the validation set (for the MPII dataset) under our experimental setup
Figure 7. Examples of untargeted adversarial attacks of different model on the MPII benchmark. The images in first row are generated
using the Attention model; second row using the 2-Stacked-Hourglass; third row using the DeepPose model; and fourth or the last row
using the Chained-Predictions model
 Figure 8. Some examples predictions of DLCM model when subject to universal perturbations. All images (left) are subject to same
perturbation computed for DLCM and new predictions in (right)
 Figure 9. Some examples predictions of 8-SHG model when subject to universal perturbations. All images (left) are subject to same
perturbation computed for 8-SHG and new predictions in (right)
 Figure 10. Some examples predictions of Attn-HG model when subject to universal perturbations. All images (left) are subject to same
perturbation computed for Attn-HG and new predictions in (right)
 Figure 11. Some examples predictions of 2-SHG model when subject to universal perturbations. All images (left) are subject to same
perturbation computed for 2-SHG and new predictions in (right)
 Figure 12. Some examples predictions of Chained Predictoions model when subject to universal perturbations. All images (left) are subject
to same perturbation computed for Chained Predictions and new predictions in (right)
 Figure 13. Some examples predictions of DeepPose model when subject to universal perturbations. All images (left) are subject to same
perturbation computed for DeepPose and new predictions in (right)
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
DeepPose 60.27 46.01 32.69 20.17 10.48 5.99 3.96 3.06
Chained 83.9 69.66 50.25 30.38 15.48 7.6 4.93 3.49
2-SHG 81.48 69.52 55.11 39.75 26.16 15.13 8.07 4.29
2-SHG-ALL 79.5 64.5 47.2 31.66 19.43 10.71 5.45 3.31
ResDec-Pre 91.07 82.17 67.49 48.85 30.82 17.33 9.27 5.25
ResDec-NoPre 91.1 82.73 68.05 47.81 28.45 14.19 7.23 4.39
8-SHG 81.34 70.54 57.36 44.08 31.42 20.39 11.91 5.5
8-SHG-ALL 81.52 69.79 55.41 40.34 26.33 15.2 8.68 4.21
Attn-HG 79.23 66.67 51.48 36.55 25.36 16.09 10.42 5.19
DLCM 80.53 69.36 56.02 42.19 29.3 17.72 10.86 5.12
Table 3. Relative PCKh results for different  values for IGSM-U-10 attacks on all models
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
DeepPose 7.68 13.11 26.18 52.91 75.51 79.73 76.69 72.95
Chained 5.62 9.45 17.9 34.05 56.17 72.61 80.36 82.81
2-SHG 5.21 10.13 21.69 39.61 56.04 66.33 71.21 74.52
2-SHG-ALL 5.35 12.85 34.36 59.86 73.87 80.47 83.76 85.0
ResDec-Pre 3.72 5.26 9.15 17.87 34.27 51.65 62.17 66.73
ResDec-NoPre 3.56 5.02 9.16 18.99 37.75 56.61 66.28 71.05
8-SHG 4.9 8.32 16.36 32.07 48.84 60.45 65.57 67.34
8-SHG-ALL 5.8 12.01 27.41 48.62 64.12 72.65 75.69 77.6
Attn-HG 5.93 10.83 21.02 34.64 47.51 55.51 59.24 61.69
DLCM 6.15 10.19 17.43 63.09 43.7 52.85 56.05 54.3
Table 4. Absolute PCKh with respect to the target results for different  values for IGSM-T-20 attacks on all models
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
DeepPose 86.9 72.01 48.07 20.99 8.99 6.83 7.14 7.01
Chained 94.73 86.04 70.02 45.15 21.7 9.69 5.88 4.81
2-SHG 91.02 79.45 60.86 39.61 24.12 15.39 10.6 6.59
2-SHG-ALL 89.68 68.56 35.68 15.63 8.77 5.67 4.28 3.6
ResDec-Pre 97.23 93.38 84.55 66.22 39.68 19.67 11.14 7.65
ResDec-NoPre 97.13 93.67 84.67 65.24 36.99 17.32 9.98 7.05
8-SHG 93.76 86.58 72.27 50.62 31.72 18.5 11.92 8.12
8-SHG-ALL 89.58 74.5 49.27 26.6 14.18 9.11 6.4 4.98
Attn-HG 91.05 80.21 62.38 44.97 32.29 22.33 16.94 11.91
DLCM 91.39 84.1 71.56 29.66 33.93 21.64 14.74 10.57
Table 5. Relative PCKh results for different  values for IGSM-T-20 attacks on all model
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
DeepPose 68.67 59.63 51.76 45.85 42.92 42.2 41.92 37.41
Chained 88.61 82.13 74.71 67.36 61.59 57.72 54.6 47.76
2-SHG 89.02 84.18 79.42 75.14 72.24 69.46 64.93 48.31
2-SHG-ALL 88.89 83.37 77.59 72.57 68.76 65.49 60.61 45.46
8-SHG 89.72 85.65 82.01 79.24 77.46 75.45 68.85 40.68
8-SHG-ALL 90.23 85.9 81.92 78.94 76.58 74.36 67.49 40.45
Attn-HG 88.52 84.7 81.33 79.58 78.52 76.77 67.83 28.2
DLCM 89.68 85.84 82.15 78.99 77.4 76.1 71.66 51.87
Table 6. Relative PCKh results for different  values for FGSM-U attacks on all models
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
DeepPose 5.72 6.63 7.62 8.39 8.81 8.84 8.09 7.83
Chained 4.53 5.48 6.6 7.65 8.32 8.7 8.76 8.44
2-SHG 3.29 3.91 4.56 4.99 5.36 5.68 5.77 5.57
2-SHG-ALL 3.29 3.93 4.73 5.29 5.91 6.06 6.1 5.92
8-SHG 3.17 3.59 4.09 4.21 4.6 4.66 4.75 5.67
8-SHG-ALL 3.21 3.82 4.27 4.82 5.1 5.27 5.42 5.69
Attn-HG 3.38 3.79 4.22 4.29 4.27 4.13 4.18 3.63
DLCM 3.47 4.07 4.47 4.75 5.09 4.96 5.09 5.51
Table 7. Absolute PCKh with respect to the target results for different  values for FGSM-T attacks on all models
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
DeepPose 58.09 42.11 24.8 6.7 1.1 0.23 0.1 0.1
Chained 83.26 66.98 42.28 16.72 3.18 0.52 0.23 0.22
2-SHG 78.54 62.69 50.59 32.4 17.31 7.13 2.27 0.53
8-SHG 78.89 64.69 47.52 29.05 12.53 3.47 0.56 0.13
Attn-HG 76.48 59.27 39.71 20.34 7.49 2.09 0.46 0.21
DLCM 77.07 61.59 41.97 22.56 7.42 1.75 0.47 0.19
Table 8. Relative PCKh results for different  values for IGSM-U-100 attacks on all model
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
DeepPose 8.33 15.77 39.78 80.27 97.84 98.97 99.06 98.85
Chained 5.84 11.14 26.41 60.48 90.53 97.76 98.9 99.18
2-SHG 6.12 15.7 39.24 63.84 76.58 82.96 86.52 88.43
8-SHG 5.93 13.0 34.33 66.62 86.63 94.07 96.47 97.52
Attn-HG 7.82 19.39 42.7 66.95 80.73 86.79 90.37 92.76
DLCM 7.67 15.65 34.08 95.41 82.21 91.38 94.69 95.98
Table 9. Absolute PCKh with respect to the target results for different  values for IGSM-T-100 attacks on all model
newell newell-all attention DLCM 2HG-all 2HG chain-pred DeepPose
newell 26.25 31.75 81.56 77.29 53.45 68.17 63.23 86.7
attention 70.65 69.99 31.15 79.27 61.05 71.68 68.1 84.78
DLCM 80.46 79.23 87.18 39.41 64.45 74.02 67.41 84.93
2HG 72.67 72.15 86.18 83.21 28.09 46.14 81.34 96.42
chain-pred 89.01 87.97 92.42 91.34 88.56 92.51 52.89 91.85
DeepPose 81.71 79.75 87.06 83.51 82.81 87.3 68.65 27.85
Table 10. Results of all source-target pairs under the doubly black box setting of universal perturbations for an  value of 8
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
Chained 81.74 69.25 52.36 33.37 16.59 7.38 3.17 1.54
2-SHG 80.59 69.67 56.4 41.69 27.0 15.2 7.27 2.95
DeepPose 91.25 79.4 57.82 31.13 11.11 3.31 1.2 0.49
Table 11. Relative PCK on the COCO dataset results for different  values under IGSM-U-10 attacks on all models
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
Chained 4.76 8.33 15.55 28.23 44.69 58.62 65.89 67.49
2-SHG 5.59 10.87 22.25 41.62 61.78 73.9 79.21 79.78
DeepPose 3.3 4.86 7.99 12.98 18.26 21.33 22.79 23.12
Table 12. Absolute PCK on the COCO dataset with respect to the target labels for different  values under IGSM-T-20 attacks on all models
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
Chained 87.61 81.68 75.34 69.17 63.96 60.49 58.63 50.67
2-SHG 87.51 82.31 77.01 72.47 69.2 67.03 63.7 48.21
DeepPose 94.54 89.5 82.72 74.9 67.93 63.48 61.45 48.67
Table 13. Relative PCK on the COCO dataset for different  values under FGSM-U attacks on all models
Model 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
Chained 3.41 4.13 4.86 5.5 6.06 6.31 6.26 5.14
2-SHG 3.37 3.98 4.69 5.22 5.74 5.95 5.94 6.47
DeepPose 2.89 3.36 4.0 4.54 4.92 5.18 5.36 5.96
Table 14. Absolute PCK on the COCO dataset with respect to the target labels for different  values under FGSM-T attacks on all models
Model Nose Eye Ear Shoulder Elbow Wrist Hip Knee Ankle
Relative PCKh
DeepPose 7.89 5.97 3.65 4.71 1.70 2.10 0.95 0.26 0.24
2-SHG 29.02 33.37 32.30 20.46 5.79 4.19 3.62 2.97 2.15
Chained 11.25 11.10 16.63 11.95 3.34 2.19 3.26 1.89 1.61
Table 15. Relative PCKh of different body-joints for untargeted attacks across different models on the COCO dataset. Note that hips, knee
and ankles are more vulnerable than the rest.
Model PCK on Validation Set
2-SHG 85.0
Chained 81.4
DeepPose 70.4
Table 16. Table showing the original performance of the models on the validation set (for the COCO Keypoints dataset) under our experi-
mental setup
Model Raw Attacks Flipping Gaussian Blurring
8-SHG 20.4 69.61 68.90
Attn-HG 31.14 82.85 75.39
DLCM 39.41 71.14 68.89
2-SHG 15.18 64.3 62.7
Chained 7.6 67.15 73.3
DeepPose 5.6 56.9 47.6
Table 17. Effectiveness of flipping and gaussian blurring on image dependent (IGSM-U-10) attacks (MPII dataset)
Model Raw Attacks Flipping Gaussian Blurring
8-SHG 8.85 25.82 43.24
Attn-HG 11.47 56.24 57.05
DLCM 12.75 44.02 52.36
2-SHG 13.8 13.8 59.3
Chained 9.0 9.0 45.5
DeepPose 1.6 1.5 28.4
Table 18. Effectiveness of flipping and gaussian blurring on universal adversarial perturbations (MPII dataset)
